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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
WASH-A-MATIC, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
13688

WILLIS RUPP, a/k/a WILLIE RUPP,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to review a Judicial Decision of the
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, presiding, dismissing an
action brought by the Appellant for breach of contract.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
Appellant filed a complaint in the lower court seeking damages for breach of a contract entered into between
the parties. The issues were tried to the Court sitting
without a jury and thereafter, Findings of Fact, ConcluDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sions of Law and Judgment were entered holding that
there was no binding contract between the parties, that
Appellant was not, therefore, entitled to an award of
damages, and that Respondent was entitled to a judgment of dismissal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of the
lower court dismissing Appellant's complaint and pursuant thereto directing entry of judgment in favor of the
Appellant for $12,136,70 in accordance with Appellant's
prayer for relief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sometime during the Spring of 1971 a Mr. Pitcock
contacted Bert Nelson, a service representative for Nelson Service and said that a friend, Willis Rupp, was interested in a car wash installation (R. 60, 65, 70, 71).
Shortly thereafter Nelson personally contacted Rupp and
discussed with him the size and type of the possible oar
wash installation (R. 60). Nelson then contacted Jack
Thurmond, President of Wash-A-Matic, the local distributor for car wash equipment manufactured by Livingston Industries, Inc. (hereinaftter "Livingston") (R.
61). Wash-A-Matic indicated its interest in this installation and a meeting was subsequently held between Nelson, Thurmond and Rupp at Rupp's office. The possible
locations, size of and financing of the prospective car
wash was discussed (R. 63, 65, 71). Rupp, Nelson, and
Thurmond also personally viewed two alternative sites
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for installation of the car wash with the preferred location being at Rupp's office at 4500 South and Redwood
Road in Salt Lake County (R. 72). Rupp also assured
them that the proper zoning for installation of a car wash
would be no problem (R. 63, 72).
At a second meeting between the same individuals,
two leasing firms, Capital Goods and Leasing and Equipment Leasing of California, (hereinafter "Equipment
Leasing") were specifically discussed as a possible method of financing. It was agreed that the equipment was
to be purchased from Livingston, the manufacturer, and
Rupp also expressed the desire that the equipment be
installed by the fall of 1971 (R. 73). During the summer
of 1971 in either the month of June or July, Ted Martin,
a representative of Equipment Leasing, visited Salt Lake
(R. 74). While in Salt Lake Martin met with Thurmond,
Douglas J. Davis (the vice-president of Wash-A-Matic)
and Rupp in Rupp's office. Possible sites for construction of the car wash were viewed and Mr. Rupp again
assured aU present that zoning was no problem (R. 75).
On August 5th, Thurmond and Rupp met again in
Rupp's office. Rupp indicated that he wanted to get the
car wash in by fall. Thurmond responded that a signed
order would have to be executed with a deposit of $200.00
before the equipment could be ordered (R. 76, 143, 144).
Pursuant thereto, Exhibit 1-P was duly executed and
the deposit paid (R. 76).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Alternative forms of financing were discussed, including bank financing, leasing and a cash purchase from
Rupp's own funds (R. 74, 80, 153). Rupp was at that
time negotiating with Capital Goods and Leasing and
Exhibit 2-P showing an installed price for the equipment
was prepared by Wash-A-Matic and sent to Capital to
aid in such negotiations (R. 78, 79). Capital subsequently
rejected the lease (R. 79). As soon as he learned of the
Capital Goods and Leasing rejection, Thurmond contacted Rupp and asked if he wanted to go with Equipment Leasing (R. 80). Rupp agreed and within a week,
Rupp met with Thurmond and Davis at the offices of
Wash-A-Matic (R. 80). A conference telephone call was
placed to Mr. Martin of Equipment Leasing. Martin
discussed the information and documents that would be
necessary to obtain Rupp's credit approval (R. 81, 82).
Rupp subsequently supplied the necessary information
and documents (R. 82).
Within a short time after completion of the documentation, Thurmond received a call from Martin informing
him that Rupp's credit had been cleared and that the
financing was set (R, 82, 87,115 and Depo. of Ted Martin
at p. 8). Immediately thereafter Thurmond called Rupp
and stated that financing had been approved and that the
papers for Rupp's signature would be forthcoming. Upon
hearing that his credit had been cleared, Rupp was elated,
and stated "Let's get the equipment out here and get it
going, get it installed" (R. 87). Based upon Rupp's reDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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quest, Thurmond placed a call to Livingston and requested that they expedite the contract and ship the
equipment.
Equipment Leasing needed a purchase order from
Wash-A-Matic to complete the paper work on the lease.
After discussing whether Rupp wanted the lease to cover
only the equipment price or include an installed price
Rupp elected the complete installation package (R. 89).
Exhibit 3-P reflecting that price was prepared at Rupp's
office sometime during the forepart of October, 1971, and
was sent to Equipment Leasing (R. 93).
At or about that same time, the equipment arrived
in Salt Lake, having been shipped directly to Rupp (R.
94). The first shipment consisted of some fasteners and
a sign which Rupp accepted (R. 142). Wash-A-Matic received notice that the equipment had in fact been shipped
through an invoice from Livingston showing the date
of shipment and the cost of the equipment (Ex. 4-P and
R. 94, 95). A few days after receipt of the invoice, Thurmond received a call from Livingston indicating that Rupp
had refused acceptance of all but the first small shipment
of the equipment (R. 96). Upon learning of this refusal,
Thurmond contacted IML Trucklines who verified that
the equipment was still on the dock (R. 96). Thurmond
then called Rupp. For the first time in some six months
since represenatives of Wash-A-Matic first contacted
Rupp he indicated that he had a zoning problem on his
property which prevented him from installing the equipDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment.1 Nonetheless, he indicated that he was sure the
problem could be worked out and that the equipment
should be held here (R. 96).
Over the next several months Rupp apparently tried
to resolve the zoning problem which he had enooimtered.
By letter dated January 7, 1972 Rupp advised Equipment
Leasing of his zoning problems and thanked them again
for holding the commitment of funds for the purchase
and lease of the equipment (Ex. 9-P). Equipment Leasing, concerned that the equipment had never been installed and the lease closed, wrote a letter to Rupp dated
January 14, 1972 requesting that Rupp supply Equipment Leasing with a $1,000.00 deposit to "tie up the
money that we have arranged for you until you get your
land problems solved" (Ex. 8-P). Equipment Leasing
had obtained a commitment from the Chase Manhattan
Bank of New York City to supply the funds for the purchase of the equipment by Equipment Leasing (Dep. of
Mr. Martin, at pp. 8, 9 and Ex. 10-P). As of the January
14, 1972 letter, the only thing Rupp had to do to retain
the commitment of funds until such time as he had resolved his zoning problem was supply Equipment Leas1

Although the parties consistently referred to Rupp's problem as
zoning, it was not in fact a question of appropriate zoning. Rather,
Salt Lake County refused to issue Rupp a building permit, unless
Rupp donated to Salt Lake County a 10 foot wide strip of ground
for the purpose of widening 4500 South (R. 154). Rupp refused to
donate the strip and was thus unable to make the car wash installation at the 4500 South site. It should be pointed out, however, that
Rupp represented that alternative sites were available and that if
the installation could not be made at the 4500 South site, he would
install the car wash elsewhere (R. 72).
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ing with the $1,000 deposit (Depo. of Mr. Martin,
p. 9 and R. 141, 142, Ex. 8-P). The deposit was never
sent (R. 141, 142). Even then, however, Equipment
Leasing sent no termination notice to Rupp and the negotiations continued.
As a result of Rupp's request to hold the equipment
here, the equipment was stored either at IML or in a
warehouse until approximately July of 1972 at a cost of
$200.00. The storage charges were paid by Livingston
and rebilled to Wash-A-Matic (R. 99 and Ex. 7-P). In
July or August of 1972, nearly a full year after Rupp had
ordered the equipment, Thurmond and Rupp had a telephone conversation wherein Rupp stated he no longer
wanted the equipment that had been shipped and stored
at his express request nearly 10 months previous (R. 99100).
Wash-A-Matic attempted to sell the equipment without success since it was specially manufactured and too
large for any other than available locations (R. 100). As
a result, the equipment was shipped back to Kansas City
to the manufacturer (R. 100).
Inasmuch as the equipment was refused, Livingston
Industries paid the freight charges both to and from Salt
Lake City and rebilled Wash-A-Matic for those charges
as part of their regular monthly statements (R. 102 and
Ex. 5-P and 6-P). Introduction of the actual invoices
was objected to by counsel for Rupp and the court reserved ruling thereon until the end of trial. In light of
the court's ruling that financing had not been obtained
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
as required by the contract, the issue of admissibility of
the damage exhibits became moot and was not resolved
by the court. The same was true of Exhibit 7-P, the invoices of Livingston to Appellant with respect to the
storage charges for storing the equipment while in Salt
Lake City.
It is important to note that at no time during the
stormy 18 month history of this off-again on-again contract, did Rupp complain about or question financing.
In fact, Rupp expressly admitted that financing was no
problem since he could have arranged for this financing
himself if Equipment Leasing had not (R. 153). Rupp
acknowledged that it was not a lack of financing but the
problem of zoning, which was not a condition of the contract, which led to his ultimate rejection of the equipment (R. 154).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT'S C O N C L U S I O N
THAT THERE WAS NO BINDING CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES FOR
THE REASON THAT THE CLAUSE "SUBJECT TO FINANCING" HAD NOT BEEN
FULFILLED, IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
On or about August 5, 1971, Appellant and Respondent entered into a sales agreement wherein Respondent
agreed to purchase and Appellant agreed to sell certain
car wash equipment for a stated price of $25,785.01. Upon
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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execution of the agreement, Respondent paid a $200.00
deposit, receipt of which was acknowledged by Appellant
(Ex. 1-P). Under the section entitled "Special Instructions" the agreement was made "subject to financing"
and Appellant agreed to refund the deposit "if financing
not arranged."
The conclusion of the lower court, holding that the
clause "subject to financing" was not satisfied is clearly
erroneous and unsupported by the evidence. In fact, the
record shows quite the contrary — that financing was
made available, that there was a binding contract and
that Appellant is entitled to damages for the breach
thereof.
The purpose and intent of the term "subject to financing" is made clear by examination of the provisions
on the reverse side of the agreement which provide in
part:
If other than a cash sale, this contract is subject
to acceptance by the seller after approval of
purchaser's credit by finance factor at its home
office. Acknowledgment to the purchaser by
letter of acceptable credit by the finance factor
shall be deemed acceptance by the seller.
The contract is contingent upon the availability
to the purchaser of financing as set forth on the
front of this contract. Upon approval of purchaser's credit, purchaser will execute such forms
and papers as are required by the finance factor
as evidence of indebtedness and the security
therefor, and furnish co-makers and guarantors
if required. [Emphasis added.]
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It doesn't take a seer stone to decipher what was
intended by the condition "subject to financing". It
wasn't necessary that Respondent have a completed loan
with money in hand. "Subject to financing" meant subject to "credit approval". In other words, financing in
the context used herein means loan commitment.
This is certainly neither a strained nor unique construction of the term. The home building industry, for
example, has operated for years on this very system. A
prospective purchaser enters into an earnest money agreement with a contractor for the purchase of a new home
to be constructed by the contractor. The earnest money
agreement is, of course, subject to buyer's financing. The
buyer then obtains credit approval for a loan covering
the purchase price from a local lending institution. The
lending institution so advises the contractor and construction is commenced. Upon completion of the home
and occupancy by the buyer, the loan is closed, the documents signed and the funds disbursed. At what point
does the earnest money agreement become a binding
contract? Could the buyer walk away at any time prior
to the actual completion of construction and closing of
the loan without any liability to the contractor, claiming
that the earnest money agreement was not binding because he had not yet been financed? The absurdity of
such a contention is obvious, and yet that is precisely
how the lower court defined "subject to financing" in the
instant case.
That the lower court's interpretation of the clause
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"subject to financing" was erroneous is further bolstered
by the decision in Wilson v. Gray, 102 Cal. App. 2d 63,
226 P. 2d 726 (1951). There the defendant entered into
an agreement with plaintiff giving plaintiff the exclusive
option to secure for defendant a sum of money needed
to purchase certain timber lands. Plaintiff was unable
to secure the necessary funds within the option period
and a second agreement was then worked out. Plaintiff
would continue his efforts to "secure the necessary financing" and if he did so before defendant was able to
secure the said financing from other sources, then the
original agreement would be reinstated and plaintiff
would be entitled to his fee. Defendant obtained a loan
commitment on August 18. Plaintiff obtained the necessary funds on August 19. The loan commitment obtained
by defendant did not actually result in an escrow of funds
until August 20 and the documents were not prepared
or the loan closed until September 4, more than two
weeks after plaintiff had obtained the funds. Plaintiff
claimed that be had obtained the necessary financing
first and demanded payment of his fee. Defendant refused and plaintiff filed action.
On appeal from the lower court's decision in favor
of defendant, the court summarized plaintiff's contention
at 226 P. 2d 727-28 as follows:
Appellant further contends that mere negotiation of a loan resulting in the purchase of the
property by defendants, as found by the trial
court, was not sufficient to terminate Appellant's rights under the agreement but that an
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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actual completion of the loan was necessary in
order to cancel his rights.
In rejecting that contention and affirming the lower
court's decision, the Appellate Court said at 226 P. 2d
728:
We are convinced that a reasonable construction
of the words "secure the necessary financing"
when read in the light of the entire agreement
between the parties, cannot be construed to require more than an agreement on the part of a
prospective creditor to make the loan contemplated. To interpret the words so used as Appellant would have use do would only lead to more
confusion. Where one construction would make
a contract unreasonable or unfair, and another
construction, equally consistent with the language, would make it reasonable, fair and just,
the latter construction is the one that must be
adopted. [Emphasis as in original.]
The record in the instant case is uncontradicted that
Respondent had obtained "credit approval" and that the
finance factor, Equipment Leasing, had agreed to provide
the necessary funds for the purchase of the car wash
equipment.
Respondent by his own choice sought to finance
purchase of the car wash equipment through a leasing
arrangement with Equipment Leasing (R. 79-80). Respondent, in compliance with the request of Equipment
Leasing, supplied them with a variety of information and
documents pertaining to Respondent's credit approval
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(R. 82). Shortly thereafter, Mr. Ted Marin of Equipment Leasing advised both Jack Thurmond, the President of Appellant, and Respondent, that Respondent's
credit had been approved (R. 82 and Depo. of Ted Martin, p. 8). In a letter dater January 7, 1972, from Respondent to Mr. Martin, Respondent apologized for the
extended delay in closing the lease transaction as a result
of some zoning problems and then acknowledged the
agreement of Equipment Leasing to provide financing in
the following words:
We are sorry for the delay, and greatly appreciate your holding this financing available
for us.
(Ex. 9-P). Approximately a week later, in a letter dated
January 14, 1972 from Mr. Martin to Respondent, Mr.
Martin reaffirmed the commitment of Equipment Leasing to provide the necessary funding and requested a
$1,000.00 deposit from Respondent in order to extend
the commitment (Ex. 8-P).
Admittedly, at that point no funds had changed
hands and could not until the appropriate lease documents were prepared and executed. Again, admittedly,
such documents were never executed and the funds were
never disbursed. But that simply is not the issue.
Whether the lease was signed or even prepared is immaterial! Only two questions need be asked and their
answers are clear. Had Respondent received credit approval? Yes. Had Equipment Leasing agreed to supply
the necessary funds? Yes. To say that Equipment LeasDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ing's agreement to supply funds was subject to Respondent's execution of the necessary lease documents is to
say nothing more than the obvious. That was equally
true in Wilson v. Gray, supra, but that did not detract
from the validity of the agreement to supply financing.
This is equally true in every credit transaction involving
a loan commitment. Nevertheless, reasonable men justifiably rely upon that commitment and proceed to materially and unalterably change their positions in reliance
thereon. That is all that was contemplated by the term
"subject to financing" in the instant sales contract and
as soon as Respondent had obtained credit approval and
the agreement of Equipment Leasing to supply the necessary funds, financing, within the meaning of the sales
contract, was secured and the contract was binding.
Conditions precedent, such as that involved here,
must be looked at fairly in the context in which they are
used and in which they are intended to operate. As noted
in the case of Pacific-Wyoming Oil Co. v. Carter Oil
Co., 31 Wyo. 314, 226 P. 193 (1924), the court in discussing the effect of conditions precedent in a contract
stated at 226 P. 198:
These cases illustrate the proposition that,
in the absence of a specific provision in the contract showing a contrary intention, the law considers a condition fully performed when the purpose evinced by the contract can be said to have
been fairly carried out.
That the condition "subject to financing" has in the inDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
stant case been "fairly carried out" is evidenced by the
testimony of the defendant on cross examinaition in regard
to the matter of financing:
Q. It was the building permit that was
holding you up, wasn't it?
A. That and the dedication of the ground.
Q. You weren't really concerned, were you,
Mr. Rupp, about financing at that point. It was
building permit and zoning that was causing
you problems, wasn't it?
A. That, and I wanted to see what I was
going to pay for, which I hadn't ever been exposed to.
Q. But you had no concern, did you at
that time, that the money was there available
for you and that the financing had been arranged
if you wanted to take advantage of it?
A. I don't think it was ever brought up.
Financing was — has never been too much of a
problem.
Q. For you?
A. That's right.
Q. You always felt you could get it financed, didn't you?
A. We probably could have if this had
failed but we never pursued anything.
Q. So it was really a problem of building
permit, wasn't it, Mr. Rupp?
A. It was a large obstacle.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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MR. DAVIES: I don't have any further
questions.
(R. 154.)
The decision of the lower court holding that such
condition had not been met is clearly erroneous and must
be reversed.
POINT II.
THE "SUBJECT TO FINANCING" CLAUSE
WAS EITHER WAIVED OR EXCUSED BY
REASON OF THE STATEMENTS AND
CONDUCT OF THE RESPONDENT.
A. The "Subject to Financing" Clause was Waived.
The evidence is conclusive that the Respondent's
desire to have the car wash operational before Fall of
1971 caused the Appellant to notify Livingston to begin
manufacture of the goods. Respondent was insistent
that the equipment was to be installed by the Fall of
1971 (R. 73). On cross examination he reluctantly admitted that he told Mr. Thurmond, the President of
Appellant, of his desire to have the equipment installed:
Q. Had you ever talked about that with
Mr. Thurmond.
A. Of the itme element?
Q. Of the need to get the equipment ordered so we would have — you would have it
here and installed by the fall.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A. Probably did.
(R. 143-44.)
Whatever the reason behind Respondent's desire to
have the car wash operational by Fall of 1971, the important fact is that after Exhibit 1-P was signed the
equipment was ordered from Livingston at the insistence
of Respondent. He was not forced or coerced into signing
the sales contract, and failed to dissent or object when
the equipment was ordered at his insistence.
Exhibit 1-P on its face provides "THIS ORDER IS
SUBJECT TO ACCEPTANCE BY OUR HOME OFFICE AND CANNOT BE CANCELLED AFTER
MANUFACTURE BEGINS." Even if the "subject to
financing" clause was not fulfilled, (which, as noted in
Ptoint I, it clearly was), the fact remains that the Respondent ordered the car washing equipment which was
specially designed and manufactured to fit his property.
Any notice of the repudiation of the sales contract was
not received until after the car washing equipment was
manufactured and shipped to Utah. The Respondent
in accepting the performance on the part of the Appellant without asserting the condition of financing thus
waived his right to later assert the condition. Corbin on
Contracts § 752 at 707 (1952). As stated in 17 Am. Jur.
2d, Contracts, § 392 at 838:
The performance of a condition may be waived
by an action in reliance upon a representation
that the performance of a condition will not be
insisted upon; and such a representation may
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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be inferred from customary conduct. The performance of conditions is dispensed with where
the performance thereof is waived by acceptance
of performance differing from that required by
the contract.
This court has ruled on the question of the waiver
of a condition precedent in Ahrendt v. Bobbitt, 119 Utah
465, 229 P. 2d 296 (1951). The case involved an assignment of a debt which was subject to the condition precedent of payment of certain funds. In holding that the
condition could be waived the court at 229 P. 2d 297
quoted with approval from 17 C. J. S. Contracts § 491
as follows:
[Performance of a condition precedent to
taking effect of one contract may be waived
by the acts of the parties in treating the agreement as in effect.
See also Reynolds Metals Co. v. Electric Smith Construeturn Equipment, 4 Wash. App. 695, 483 P. 2d 880 (1971);
Gilmore v. Hoffman, 123 Cal. App. 2d 313, 266 P. 2d 833
(1954); Concarmon v. Yewell, 16 Ariz. App. 320, 493 P.
2d 122 (1972).
Respondent now claims that the condition precedent
"subject to financing" was never fulfilled and he is thereby not bound by the sales agreement. Yet he ordered and
even encouraged early delivery. He accepted partial delivery of the goods when they were shipped to Salt Lake
(R. 142). As late as January 7, 1972 he related by letter
to Mr. Martin of Equipment Leasing, "We are very
anxious to get underway with the car wash as soon as
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possible, and get same in operation" (Ex. 9-P). The inferences to be drawn from such conduct are clear. Respondent was not concerned with financing. He admitted
it was no obstacle (R. 154). He wanted the equipment
and he got it. He must not now be excused from the consequences of his own actions.
B.

The "Subject to Financing" Clause was Excused.

In a letter dated January 19, 1972, Mr. Martin of
Equipment Leasing requested a One Thousand Dollar
($1,000) deposit from Respondent which would continue
to "tie the money up". This was required to hold the
financing until such time as the Respondent's recently
revealed land problems were solved. The deposit was to
be in the office of Equipment Leasing by January 20,
1972. This money was not sent by the Respondent. The
plain fact of the matter is that the Respondent was trying to stall the actual payment of funds until he "straightened his land problems out".
When a contract of sale is subject to the condition
precedent of the purchaser's obtaining financing the courts
are unanimous in holding that the purchaser must make
diligent efforts to obtain financing. In White & Bollard,
Inc. v. Goodenow, 58 Wash. 2d 180, 361 P. 2d 571 (1961),
a broker sued for his real estate commission. The seller
had accepted an offer contingent upon purchaser obtaining satisfactory financing within a period of 90 days from
date of execution of the agreement. In discussing the
effect of such requirement the court stated at 361 P. 2d
575:
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[T]he promise which he made was, not to secure
the financing, but to endeavor to do so, and to
purchase the property if he was successful. In
agreeing to immediately seek and use his best
efforts to secure financing, the purchaser promised to do positive acts.
In Reese v. Walker, 77 Ohio L. Abs, 583, 151 N. E.
2d 605 (1958), the plaintiffs were prospective buyers who
made a written offer to purchase a certain parcel of real
estate, pursuant to standard form real estate contract
"contingent upon securing necessary financing". The
financing arranged by the buyers was unsatisfactory to
the sellers and the buyers sued for the return of their
earnest money offer. At 151 N. E. 2d 608, the Court discussed the obligation of the buyer as follows:
Of course, buyers must show good faith. They
cannot defeat the contract by their own fault.
They must honestly determine what kind of loan
they need and must make a bona fide effort to
obtain it.
Here Respondent not only failed to use and exercise
diligent effort in obtaining financing, but actually hindered its obtainance. Month after month the payment
of the deposit was delayed based upon Respondent's representations to Equipment Leasing that he was having
difficulty with the zoning of the land the car washing
equipment was to be placed upon. If the financing was
being held up it was not by the Appellant or Equipment
Leasing.
When the occurrence of a condition is within the
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control of one party to a contract, that party is under
an implied promise to use best efforts to fulfill the condition. The party cannot remain totally aloof and then
rely on the failure of a condition as an excuse for nonperformance of his contractual obligation. Failure to use
best efforts excuses the condition. Tyson v. Tyson, 61
Ariz. 329, 149 P. 2d 674 (1944). The Restatement of
Contracts, § 295 at 428 clearly states the rules as
follows:
// a promissor prevents or hinders the occurrence of a condition, or the performance of a return promise, and the condition would have occurred or the performance of the return promise
been rendered except for such prevention or
hindrance, the condition is excused, and the actual or threatened nonperformance of the return
promise does not discharge the promissofs duty,
unless
(a) the prevention or hindrance by the
promissor is caused or justified by the conduct
or pecuniary circumstances of the other party;
or
(b) the terms of the contract are such that
the risk of such prevention or hindrance as occurs is assumed by the other party. [Emphasis
added.]
If the condition "subject to financing" ran to the
benefit of Appellant, then it is elementary that Appellant
could on its own volition waive the condition. Gilmore
v. Hoffman, 123 Cal. App, 2d 313, 266 P. 2d 833 (1954).
If the condition "subject to financing" was for the benefit
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of Respondent, then Respondent was under a duty to
use diligent efforts in obtaining financing. The record
is void of any facts indicating that the Respondent was
refused any documents from the finance factor, Equitable
Leasing, and by his own conduct, Respondent failed to
tender a deposit to hold the financing. Such action excuses the condition.
C. Oral Contract Absent the Condition.
Even assuming arguendo that the written sales
agreement is unenforoeable because of the failure of a
condition precedent Respondent's actions give rise to an
enforceable oral contract. Section 70A-2-201 (3) (a) Utah
Code Annotated (Repl. vol. 1968) provides that an oral
agreement is nevertheless enforceable even though in
violation of the statute of frauds if
the goods are to be specially manufactured for
the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others
in the ordinary course of the seller's business
and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer,
has made either a substantial beginning of their
manufacture or commitments for their procurement . . . .
Respondent's actions clearly meet each of the statutory
requisites. The car wash equipment, because of its unusual size, had to be specially manufactured for the Respondent (R. 100). Again due to its unusual size, the
equipment was not suitable for sale to other prospective
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purchasers even though Appellant attempted without
success to make a sale of the equipment. Respondent
ordered the goods, requested their manufacture and delivery, accepted partial delivery thereof, and did not give
any notice of repudiation until some ten months alter
the equipment had in fact been manufactured and delivered to Salt Lake City. Such actions constitute an
enforceable oral contract without any condition precedent
concerning financing.
POINT III.
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO ITS INCIDENTAL DAMAGES INCLUDING THE
AMOUNTS PAID TO LIVINGSTON AS REIMBURSEMENT FOR F R E I G H T AND
STORAGE CHARGES.
As a result of the finding of the lower court that the
sales agreement was unenforceable, the lower court did
not make any final determination on the issue of damages and ultimately failed to rule on the admissibility
of Appellant's damage exhibits, Exhibits 5-P through 7-P.
This evidence was clearly admissible, however, and Appellant is entitled to its reasonably incurred incidental
damages.
The express language of the sales contract (Ex. 1-P)
provides that the goods were to be shipped F. 0. B. from
Kansas City. Respondent refused to accept part of the
shipment upon its arrival in Salt Lake. After unsuccessDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ful efforts to sell the car washing equipment were made,
the equipment was shipped back to the manufacturer in
Kansas City. Utah Code Annotated, § 70A-2-710 (Repl.
vol.1968) provides:
Incidental damages to an aggrieved seller include any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody
of goods after the buyer's breach, in connection
with the return or resale of the goods or otherwise resulting from the breach.
On direct examination, Mr. Thurmond, an officer
of Appellant, testified as follows in regard to the shipment of the equipment:
Q. How was the freight handled or to be
handled on the shipment of this equipment, Mr.
Thurmond?
A. The freight was to be handled collect
and paid by Mr. Rupp. Insomuch as he did not
accept the entire shipment Livingston ended up
billing us for the freight out to Salt Lake, and
they in turn billed us for the storage while it
was in the warehouse, and they in turn billed
us for the shipment back to — freight back to
Kansas City from Salt Lake.
THE COURT: Do I understand all the
equipment was returned to —
MR. DAVIE S: Returned to the manufacturer.
THE WITNESS: To Kansas City.
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THE COURT: Does the original contract
mention the word whether that price was F. 0. B.
manufacture or deliver to Salt Lake or where?
MR. DAVIES: It indicates F. O. B. Kansas City, Your Honor, if I'm not mistaken.
THE COURT: All right. I haven't had a
chance to see it yet.
(R. 101.)
Appellant's Exhibits 5-7 are invoices from Livingston to Wash-A-Matic for freight and storage costs
amounting to $4,080.57. When the Respondent failed to
pay the freight and storage charges, the charges were
billed to the manufacturer who then billed Appellant.
The costs were paid by Appellant as indicated by the
following testimony of Mr. Thurmond:
Q. (By Mr. Davies) Mr. Thurmond, let
me show you what has been marked as Exhibit
5-P and ask you if you can identify that for us,
please?
A. Yes, this is the invoice on Mr. Rupp's
equipment for the freight bills and invoiced to
Wash-A-Matic.
Q. From who.
A. From Livingston to us for the cost of
getting the equipment out here.
Q. This is the cost of shipping the equipment to Salt Lake?
A. This is the cost of shipping the equipment to Salt Lake.
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THE COURT: What number is that?
MR. DA VIES: Exhibit 5-P, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
Lake?

Freight charges to Salt

MR. DAVIES: Yes, Your Honor.
Q. (By Mr. Davies) Was that freight bill
subsequently — excuse me, was Livingston, Inc.
subsequently reimbursed for the freight cost pursuant to that invoice by Wash-A-Matic?
Q. Yes, that is billed against us and we are
responsible for it.
THE COURT: The question was, "Did you
pay it?"
THE WITNESS: I pay on a monthly statement, I don't know if there was an actual check
written out for that amount, no.
Q. Was this bill then added to your regular statement.
A. Billed and added to our regular statement as our invoices.
Q. And you pay that statement on a monthly basis?
A. Yes.
Q. Let me show you now what has been
marked, Mr. Thurmond, as Exhibit 6-P and ask
you if you can identify that for us, please?
A. Yes, this is an invoice also on Mr. Rupp's
equipment for the return of the equipment to
the manufacturer, Livingston Industries, at
which they have invoiced and billed us for and
put on our statement.
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Q. And would your answers with reference
to 6-P concerning payment of that invoice be
the same as it was for Exhibit 5-P?
(R. 102.)
Mr. Thurmond's testimony concerning Exhibit 7-P,
the invoices for storage charges, was similar (R. 106).
Appellant's Exhibits 5, 6 and 7 are duplicate originals and are admissible, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 78-25-16 (1953). Respondent admitted the
documents were received by the Appellant from Livingston (R. 106), but argued that they were not admissible,
on the ground that they were hearsay. On the basis of
this objection, the lower court reserved ruling on the
admissibility of the exhibits until the close of trial (R.
104). The ruling was never forthcoming.
Rule 63 (13) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides:
Business Entries and the Like. Writings
offered as memoranda or records of acts, conditions or events to prove the facts stated therein,
if the judge finds that they were made in the
regular course of a business at or about the time
of the act, condition or event recorded, and that
the sources of information from which made and
the method and circumstances of their preparation were such as to indicate their trustworthiness:
Invoices have been universally held to be business entries. See Annotations found in 17 A. L. R. 2d 235 and
83 A. L. R. 806.
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For example, in Zerbinos v. Lewis, 394 P. 2d 886
(Alaska, 1964), a driver sued for injuries received when
his vehicle was struck by another vehicle driven by the
defendant. The plaintiff contended that the trial court
committed reversible error by admitting into evidence
two receipts purportedly issued to the defendant for
money paid to a service station for services rendered on
her car, including items for brake adjustment and brake
fluid about two months prior to the accident. The court
held that on the question of the admissibility of the receipts that they were not hearsay.
Similarly, Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Wood,
88 Okla. 95, 212 P. 132 (1923), involved a suit on a burglary insurance policy which required keeping a set of
books. The court held that original invoices of merchandise purchased were admissible and not considered hearsay.
Under the present facts, Mr. Thurmond as president
of Appellant testified as to the actual amount of incidental damages paid and insurred as a result of the
breach of contract by the Respondent. Appellant's Exhibits 5-7 are invoices reflecting such expenditures and
should be admissible as further evidence of the incidental
damages suffered by Appellant as a result of Respondent's breach of contract.
POINT IV.
LOSS OF PROFITS IS A PROPER MEA-
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SURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT.
Exhibit 4-P as admitted into evidence is the bill and
invoice from Livingston to the Appellant for the cost of
the car-washing equipment ordered by the Respondent.
The amount stated on the face of the invoice is $17,698.88.
The difference between the contract price of $25,755.01
as found on Exhibit 1-P and Appellant's cost of $17,698.88 is $8,056.13. Under Utah law the amount of $8,056.13 is a proper measure of damages for Respondent's
breach of contract. § 70A-2-708 Utah Code Annotated
(Repl. vol. 1968).
As stated in 67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales § 652 at 847-50:
The Uniform Commercial Code appears to follow the view that a dealer, manufacturer's agent,
or middleman should have as a measure of damages his lost profits where the buyer has
breached. This eliminates the unfair and economically wasteful results arising under the older law when fixed price articles were involved.
The Uniform Commercial Code permits the recovery of lost profits in all appropriate cases,
which would include all standard priced goods;
and the normal measure there would be list
price less cost to the dealer.
The Respondent is, in addition to the incidental damages suffered by Appellants, liable for the loss of profits
of the Appellant.
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CONCLUSION
The issues presented on this appeal are far from
complicated. The court is faced with a simple and classical contractual dispute. Two parties entered into a sales
agreement. The agreement was made subject to the purchaser's obtaining financing. The purchaser, by his own
choice, sought to finance the purchase of the equipment
set forth in the agreement through a lease arrangement.
After submission of the requisite financial information by the purchaser to the leasing company, said company approved the purchaser's credit and both verbally
and in writing committed the funds necessary to purchase
the equipment. The equipment, which had to be specially
manufactured, was ordered and shipped to Salt Lake City.
The purchaser accepted the first partial shipment and
requested that the remaining equipment shipped subsequently be held in Salt Lake City pending determination
of certain land problems.
When the purchaser could not work out his land
problems to his satisfaction (which land problems were
in no way a condition precedent to the validity of the
contract) he unilaterally decided not to go through with
the purchase, refused delivery of the balance of the
equipment and refused to pay for the same. As justification for this flagrant breach of contract, the purchaser
now contends that since he had not yet received the lease
documents for his signature and since no funds had
changed hands, he was not yet financed and there was no
binding contract.
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Reduced to its simplest terms, this appeal asks the
question: What does the condition "subject to financing"
in a sales contract mean? Does it require a completed
financial transaction including preparation and presentation for execution of all necessary documents or is the
condition fulfilled when the purchaser's credit is approved and a loan commitment given? It is submitted
that both the contract itself, normal awnmercial usage,
and the relevant case law require acceptance of the latter
definition. Based thereon, the decision of the lower court
to the contrary must be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. DAVIES
WALTER J. PLUMB, III
315 East Second South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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